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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge: 
 
Paul Knobloch challenges his judgment of conviction and 
sentence on three grounds. First, he insists that his plea to 
Count 5 of the indictment was not voluntary, knowing, and 
intelligent because the district court, in the course of the 
plea colloquy, misdescribed the elements of the offense 
charged. In addition, he contends that the court erred by 
imposing a role in the offense enhancement to his sentence 
based on testimonial evidence from a related trial, to which 
he had no reasonable opportunity to respond. Finally, he 
asserts that the court misapplied the Sentencing Guidelines 
by impermissibly enhancing his sentence for possession of 
a dangerous weapon. 
 
Because Knobloch failed to call these alleged errors to the 
attention of the district court, we review for plain error only. 
While the district court committed an apparently 
inadvertent error in describing the elements of the offense 
charged in Count 5, we will not disturb Knobloch's guilty 
plea to that count because he does not claim that he would 
have pleaded differently had the error not occurred. 
Moreover, we find no fault in the court's consideration of 
relevant testimony from another related trial. However, we 
conclude that the district court committed plain error 
when, after it had sentenced Knobloch under 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c) for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a 
drug crime, it enhanced Knobloch's sentence under 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1 based on his possession of other firearms. 
 
I. Background 
 
Paul Knobloch and Jason Smith initiated a marijuana 
trafficking operation. In the course of the conspiracy, they 
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received a 1000-pound crate of marijuana, which they 
stored in Smith's home. Sometime later, Knobloch and 
Jeffrey Davis executed a plan to steal approximately 300 
pounds of this stash. While Knobloch diverted Smith at a 
nightclub, Davis used a van borrowed from Knobloch's 
father to steal the marijuana and transport it to a storage 
locker. Over the next five months, Knobloch, Davis, and 
Daniel Goodwin sold approximately half of this marijuana 
and divided the proceeds. 
 
Knobloch was also contemporaneously involved in the 
distribution of anabolic steroids. At one point, Knobloch 
sold Davis a bag of steroids. By that time, however, Davis 
was cooperating with the authorities, and Knobloch was 
arrested at the scene of the transfer immediately after the 
exchange. Police seized a loaded Glock 19, 9-mm handgun 
from Knobloch at the time of the arrest. When they later 
searched Knobloch's apartment, they found two other 
handguns--a Spectre .45 with a laser sight and a TEC-9, 
9-mm semi-automatic--and ammunition clips in close 
proximity to a large carton of anabolic steroids. 
 Knobloch was subsequently indicted on six counts. 
Counts 1, 4, and 5 charged him, respectively, with 
conspiracy to distribute marijuana, distribution of anabolic 
steroids to Davis, and using and carrying the Glock 19, 
9-mm handgun during and in relation to the distribution of 
anabolic steroids to Davis. Two of the other three counts, 
Counts 2 and 3, charged Knobloch, respectively, with 
possession with intent to distribute the anabolic steroids in 
his apartment, and with use of the Spectre .45 and the 
TEC-9 during and in relation to the possession of those 
steroids. 
 
In a plea agreement, Knobloch agreed to plead guilty to 
Counts 1, 4, and 5. He further "acknowledge[d] his 
responsibility for the conduct charged in Counts Two, Three 
and Six . . . and stipulate[d] that the conduct charged in 
those counts may be considered by . . . the District Court 
in imposing sentence." J.A. at 14-15. In exchange, the U.S. 
Attorney agreed to dismiss Counts 2, 3, and 6 after the 
imposition of sentence. 
 
As contemplated by the plea agreement, Knobloch 
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changed his original not-guilty pleas to Counts 1, 4, and 5. 
At the change of plea hearing, the court asked Knobloch a 
number of questions to ensure that his plea was voluntary, 
knowing, and intelligent. The court informed Knobloch that 
Count 5 of the indictment alleged that he "did knowingly 
use and carry a firearm, that is, a Glock 19, .9[sic] 
millimeter pistol, during and in relation to a drug 
trafficking crime" in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1).1 It 
then asked Knobloch, "Do you understand the nature of the 
charges that I just read to you, sir?" J.A. at 26. Knobloch 
responded, "Yes, I do." Id. A moment later, however, the 
court incorrectly described the elements of this crime. It 
advised Knobloch: 
 
       [I]n order to for the crime of use of a firearm in relation 
       to a drug trafficking offense to be established, the 
       Government must prove all of these essential elements 
       beyond a reasonable doubt: That the Defendant 
       knowingly used or carried a firearm as charged in the 
       indictment, that the Defendant did so during and/or in 
       relation to a drug trafficking crime. 
 
J.A. at 28 (emphasis added). The emphasized portion 
incorrectly implied that the government might secure a 
conviction on a showing that Knobloch used or carried a 
firearm either during or in relation to the crime, whereas 
the statute requires use or carrying both during and in 
relation to the crime. No one objected to this description of 
the elements of the offense, and when asked if he 
understood the necessary elements of Count 5, Knobloch 
responded, "Yes, I do." Id. The court accepted Knobloch's 
plea. 
 
In preparation for sentencing, the government and 
Knobloch filed objections to the recommendations in the 
Presentence Report. Two of the government's objections are 
relevant to this appeal. First, it requested a two-level 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 3B1.1(c) for Knobloch's 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) provides in relevant part: 
 
       Whoever, during and in relation to any crime of violence or drug 
       trafficking crime . . . uses or carries a firearm, shall . . . be 
       sentenced to imprisonment for five years . . . . 
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"supervisory role" and his "organizational position and 
leadership of Goodwin and Davis." J.A. at 49. Second, the 
government argued for another two-level enhancement 
under U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1) based on Knobloch's 
"possessing the Spectre .45 and TEC-9 assault pistols in 
connection with the cache of steroids in his apartment." 
J.A. at 47. It contended that such an enhancement was 
appropriate so long as the court "decide[d], by a 
preponderance of the evidence, that the two firearms . . . 
which were found on top of the carton full of steroids [in 
the apartment] were probably connected to the underlying 
offense of possessing steroids with intent to distribute 
them," i.e., the underlying offense charged in Count 2. J.A. 
at 47-48. The Probation office disagreed with the dangerous 
weapon enhancement, and it referred specifically to 
Application Note 2 to S 2K2.4, the provision upon which 
Knobloch relies before us. It supported the enhancement 
for Knobloch's role in the marijuana conspiracy. 
 
At the sentencing hearing, the prosecutor declared that 
"it is clear that it was Knobloch who orchestrated the theft 
of the marijuana, and he clearly supervised Davis and 
Goodwin in the theft of the marijuana and then the later 
distribution." J.A. at 75. In support of this assertion, the 
prosecutor noted that "we have that with the fact that he 
drew the plan, he being Knobloch, told Davis where to go, 
what to take, where to go after taking it, where to store it, 
meeting with Goodwin, and it was all done at the bequest 
[behest] of Mr. Knobloch." Id. In response to this, 
Knobloch's counsel observed that "it is certainly Jeff Davis' 
position that Paul Knobloch orchestrated this," but she 
challenged Davis's credibility by noting that he had been 
cooperating with the government and that "[h]e puts the 
blame on other people." Id. Up to this point, no one had 
mentioned the previous trial of Jason Smith in which Davis 
had testified before the same judge. Knobloch's counsel 
made the first reference to the trial when she asserted that 
"I don't think it is at all clear from the record as it exists, 
even in Jason Smith's trial from the bit I've heard about it, 
that this was orchestrated by Paul Knobloch. If anything, 
there was a dual role with Jeff Davis and Paul Knobloch 
together working out this scheme." J.A. at 75-76. In 
response to this, the prosecutor argued as follows: 
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       Judge, just for purposes of making your determination, 
       I would cite you to these facts that give Knobloch or at 
       least put him in a position of being that supervisor or 
       manager. He is the one that is there when it's 
       unloaded. He is the one that is called by Smith. He is 
       the one that goes to Smith's trailer later that morning 
       and finds out later the contents of it by Smith, it isn't 
       Davis. And even in Knobloch's grand jury testimony, 
       it's always him, he knows it. Your Honor, he is the one 
       -- Davis testified to you in Court that you could also 
       draw the inference of Knobloch's supervisory role. Davis 
       had never been to Smith's trailer, had never been there 
       before, didn't know what to do. And you can premise 
       your decision on those factors. 
 
J.A. at 76 (emphasis supplied). Knobloch's counsel did not 
object to this reference to Davis's testimony at Smith's trial. 
The district court concluded that a two level role in the 
offense enhancement was appropriate since Knobloch was 
"an organizer, leader, manager, or supervisor" of the crime. 
J.A. at 86. 
 
When attention was turned to the possibility of an 
enhancement under U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1), the government 
stressed that the firearms it was relying on for this purpose 
were those that were alleged in Count 3 to have been 
possessed in connection with the underlying offense 
charged in Count 2, i.e., the possession of the anabolic 
steroids in the apartment with intent to distribute. It 
pointed out that these guns were to be distinguished from 
the Glock 19 seized at the time of the Davis distribution 
which provided the foundation for Knobloch's conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. S 924(c) for carrying a firearm in relation 
to the distribution to Davis. Even though the plea 
agreement called for the dismissal of Count 2, the 
government urged only that the court find a nexus between 
the Spectre .45 and TEC-9 weapons and the possession of 
the anabolic steroids in the apartment, as alleged in that 
count. The government did not ask the court to find a 
nexus between the possession of these weapons and the 
distribution to Davis. The district court found that the 
Spectre .45 and TEC-9 were possessed in connection with 
the unlawful possession of the cache in the apartment, but 
 
                                6 
 
 
 
it made no finding with respect to any nexus between those 
firearms and the distribution to Davis. Knobloch's counsel 
argued against a finding of a connection between the 
weapons and the cache in the apartment, but she did not 
object to the absence of a finding of a connection between 
them and the Davis distribution. Nor did she make any 
reference to U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4 or its Application Notes, the 
provisions Knobloch relies upon before us. Based on its 
finding of a nexus with the cache in the apartment, the 
court enhanced Knobloch's offense level under S 2D1.1(b)(1) 
and sentenced him to 147 months of imprisonment. 
 
II. Standard of Review 
 
Knobloch did not raise before the district court any of the 
three alleged errors he relies on before us.2 Accordingly, we 
will review Knobloch's judgment of conviction and sentence 
solely for plain error. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); 18 U.S.C. 
S 3741; United States v. Oser, 107 F.3d 1080, 1088 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 206 (1997). 
 
In United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725 (1993), the 
Supreme Court held that, in order for an appellate court to 
find plain error, it must first find 1) an error 2) that is plain 
and 3) that affects substantial rights. Even if all three of 
these prerequisites are met, an appellate court may correct 
an error to which no objection was made "only if (4) the 
error `seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings.' " Johnson v. United 
States, 117 S. Ct. 1544, 1549 (1997) (quoting Olano, 507 
U.S. at 732) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Two months after he entered his plea and on the same day that he 
filed his objections to the PSI, Knobloch moved to withdraw his guilty 
plea on grounds not relevant to this appeal. The motion did not refer to 
the district court's misdescription of the elements of the offense charged 
in Count 5. The district court denied the motion immediately prior to 
sentencing. 
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III. Discussion 
 
A. The Guilty Plea 
 
The government concedes that the district court erred 
when it described one element of the S 924(c)(1) offense as 
"during and/or in relation to" a drug crime, and it further 
concedes that the error was plain. We agree with the 
government, however, that this error did not affect 
Knobloch's substantial rights. The Supreme Court 
explained in Olano that "affected substantial rights" in the 
context of plain error review "in most cases . . . means that 
the error must have been prejudicial: It must have affected 
the outcome of the district court proceedings." Olano, 507 
U.S. at 1778. The burden is on the defendant to show that 
the error in fact prejudiced him, and "[i]n most cases, a 
court of appeals cannot correct the forfeited error unless 
the defendant shows that the error was prejudicial." Id.; see 
also United States v. Bethancourt, 65 F.3d 1074, 1079 (3d 
Cir. 1995). 
 
Knobloch insists that the facts of this case are such that 
the district court's misstatement could have been material 
to a decision on how to plead to Count 5. We have searched 
the record in vain, however, for any claim by Knobloch that 
he would have entered a different plea had the district 
court correctly described the necessary elements of the 
offense. It is thus apparent that Knobloch was not 
prejudiced by the district court's misstatement of the law. 
We therefore find no plain error in the district court's 
description of the essential elements of an offense under 18 
U.S.C. S 924(c)(1). 
 
B. Role in the Offense 
 
We also decline to find plain error in the possibility that 
the district court may have relied on testimony from 
another trial to support its conclusion that Knobloch was a 
leader, organizer, or supervisor. No rule of law prohibits the 
court from making its factual conclusions at sentencing 
based on testimony from a separate proceeding, United 
States v. Reyes, 930 F.2d 310, 316 (3d Cir. 1991), and 
Knobloch concedes as much. Nonetheless, Knobloch 
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focuses on dictum from Reyes stating that "the defendant 
must be given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the 
evidence." Id. (citing Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(c)(3)). He insists 
that his attorney was taken by surprise by the court's 
consideration of Davis's testimony at Smith's trial and that 
he lacked a reasonable opportunity to respond to this 
damaging evidence. 
 
Knobloch's counsel clearly was not surprised by any 
reference to Davis's testimony--in fact, it was she who first 
mentioned the testimony. Moreover, the record 
demonstrates that counsel was afforded ample opportunity 
after the prosecutor's response to say anything she wished 
about that testimony. The court was clearly entitled to 
understand from her argument that she felt she knew 
enough about Davis's testimony at Smith's trial to make a 
representation to the court concerning its content. Based 
on that fact and the fact that counsel, following the 
prosecutor's response, did not ask for an opportunity to 
review the transcript of Davis's testimony, we conclude that 
any consideration the district court gave to that testimony 
was not error, much less plain error.3  
 
We note, as well, that the record shows no prejudice to 
Knobloch from this alleged error. Appellate counsel has had 
ample opportunity since the sentencing hearing to review 
Davis's testimony and articulate some basis for believing it 
would have benefited Knobloch in some way had the 
district court, sua sponte, ordered a continuance of the 
proceedings to afford defense counsel an opportunity for 
further preparation. No relevant theory of prejudice has 
been advanced in the briefing before us. 
 
C. Dangerous Weapon Enhancement 
 
Section 2D1.1(a) of the United States Sentencing 
Guidelines prescribes the base offense level for a crime 
involving trafficking or conspiring to traffic in drugs. 
Section 2D1.1(b)(1) provides a "specific offense 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. To the extent Knobloch is contending that the record does not support 
the court's finding regarding his role in the offense, we conclude to the 
contrary. 
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characteristic" which directs that if "a dangerous weapon 
(including a firearm) was possessed [during the offense, the 
base offense level must be] increase[d] by 2 levels." 
Application Note 3 explains that the "adjustment should be 
applied if the weapon was present [during the underlying 
offense], unless it is clearly improbable that the weapon 
was connected with the offense." 
 
Section 2K2.4 of the Guidelines provides that the 
sentence for use of a firearm during and in relation to a 
drug crime in violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c) is "the term of 
imprisonment . . . required by statute." Under the 
circumstances leading to Knobloch's S 924(c) conviction, 
this sentence was a mandatory, consecutive, five years of 
incarceration. Application Note 2 to S 2K2.4 provides as 
follows: 
 
       Where a sentence under this section is imposed in 
       conjunction with a sentence for an underlying offense, 
       any specific offense characteristic for the possession, 
       use, or discharge of an explosive or firearm (e.g., 
       S 2B3.1(b)(2)(A)-(F) (Robbery)) is not to be applied in 
       respect to the guideline for the underlying offense. 
 
In determining Knobloch's sentence for the offenses in 
Counts 1, 4 and 5 to which he pled guilty, the district court 
grouped the marijuana conspiracy and steroid distribution 
offenses to arrive at a base offense level. It then applied a 
two-level specific offense characteristic enhancement for 
possession of the Spectre .45 and the TEC-9 under 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1). In addition, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c) and U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4(a), the district court imposed 
a mandatory five-year sentence--consecutive to the 
sentence for the drug offenses--on Count 5 for using and 
carrying the Glock 19 during and in relation to Knobloch's 
sale of steroids to Davis. We conclude that the district court 
committed plain error when it applied a two-level specific 
offense characteristic enhancement under S 2D1.1(b)(1) 
when it was required to impose a five year sentence under 
S 924(c). 
 
The government's theory with respect to the S 2D1.1(b)(1) 
enhancement is not altogether clear to us. As we have 
noted, the indictment alleged that the Spectre .45 and TEC- 
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9 were possessed in connection with the offense charged in 
Count 2, i.e., possession of the carton of anabolic steroids 
in the apartment. At times, the government seems to 
suggest that, even though there has been no conviction 
under Count 2, possession of these weapons in connection 
with the crime there charged calls for a S 2D1.1(b)(1) 
enhancement because Knobloch stipulated that "the 
conduct charged in Counts Two, Three, and Six [could] be 
considered by . . . the District Court in imposing sentence." 
We reject that suggestion. 
 
Knobloch did not stipulate that he could be sentenced 
other than in accordance with the Guidelines. The 
Guidelines specify base offense levels only for crimes of 
which the defendant has been convicted, and it is apparent 
from its text and Application Note 3 that S 2D1.1(b)(1) 
authorizes a specific offense characteristic enhancement 
only for a dangerous weapon possessed in connection with 
the offense of conviction giving rise to the base offense level 
to be enhanced.4 
 
At other times, the government appears to be arguing 
that the possession of the Spectre .45 and the TEC-9 calls 
for an enhancement under S 2D1.1(b)(1) because that 
possession was in connection with the anabolic steroid 
distribution to Davis charged in Count 4. This theory is 
flawed in two ways. First, the district court made no finding 
of any connection between the carton of steroids in the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Knobloch stipulated in his plea agreement that "the conduct charged 
in Counts Two, Three and Six [was `relevant conduct' to] be considered 
by the District Court in imposing sentence." The possession of the guns 
in the apartment was thus clearly relevant conduct. But a sentencing 
court can look to relevant conduct only to answer the questions posed 
by the relevant guidelines. Here, the issue posed by S 2D1.1(b)(1) was 
whether Knobloch possessed a dangerous weapon in connection with the 
distribution to Davis, the offense upon which he was being sentenced, 
and the court was free to look to all relevant conduct in resolving this 
issue. The government, however, suggests that the court could properly 
look to relevant conduct to answer a question not posed by S 2D1.1(b)(1), 
i.e., whether Knobloch possessed a dangerous weapon in connection 
with his possession of the carton of steroids in the apartment, an offense 
of which he had not been convicted and on which he was not being 
sentenced. It is this suggestion that we reject. 
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apartment and the steroids distributed to Davis or of any 
other nexus between the Spectre .45 and the TEC-9 and 
the Davis transaction. 
 
There is a more fundamental problem with the 
government's second theory, however -- one that could not 
be remedied if we were to remand for further proceedings. 
The government's problem here is irremediable because a 
S 2D1.1(b)(1) enhancement of the base offense level for the 
distribution to Davis is barred by the unambiguous 
directive found in Application Note 2 to S 2K2.4. 
 
Courts are required to follow the Application Notes to the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines in imposing sentences for 
federal offenses. Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36, 38 
(1993); United States v. Figueroa, 105 F.3d 874, 876 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 1860 (1997). Application Note 
2 to U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4 plainly prohibits a two-level 
enhancement under these circumstances for possession of 
any firearm--whether it be the one directly involved in the 
underlying offense or another firearm, even one in a 
different location. If the court imposes a sentence for a drug 
offense along with a consecutive sentence under 18 U.S.C. 
S 924(c) based on that drug offense, it simply cannot 
enhance the sentence for the drug offense for possession of 
any firearm.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The government asserts that three other courts of appeals have 
reached a contrary conclusion. We find none of the three cited cases 
persuasive on the relevant point because none of them undertakes any 
analysis of the Note or bases its legal conclusion on it. In United States 
v. Willett, 90 F.3d 404 (9th Cir. 1996), the court affirmed an 
enhancement for possession of a knife and a silencer along with a 
sentence under section 924(c). See id. at 407. The court in Willett 
addressed only an argument that this constituted impermissible double 
counting, not that it violated Application Note 2. In United States v. 
Washington, 44 F.3d 1271 (5th Cir. 1995), the court also addressed a 
double counting argument--not an asserted violation of Application Note 
2. Washington had received a sentence under 924(c) for his firearm as 
well as an enhancement pursuant to section 2K2.4 because he had 
armed his accomplice with another firearm. Although the court quoted 
Application Note 2, see id. at 1280-81 n. 31, it did not analyze or base 
its legal conclusion on the Note. It concluded only that this did not 
constitute double counting because the 924(c) sentence and the 2K2.4 
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Thus, the court erred in applying the dangerous weapon 
enhancement to Knobloch's sentence. We further conclude 
that this error was plain, i.e., clear. Given the unambiguous 
directive of Application Note 2 and the fact that it was 
specifically called to the attention of the district court by 
the Probation Office, we are at a loss to explain why that 
Application Note was ignored in the course of the 
sentencing. As we have noted, to support a discretionary 
correction of this "plain error," the district court's mistake 
must have affected Knobloch's substantial rights in a way 
that seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public 
reputation of judicial proceedings. We have no trouble 
acknowledging that the error in this case in fact affected 
Knobloch's substantial right to suffer no greater an 
imposition on his liberty than the Guidelines allow. We also 
recognize that the Guidelines were designed to promote fair 
and consistent treatment of offenders, and that the 
diversion from the Guidelines in this case seriously affected 
the fair administration of the sentencing process. The two- 
level enhancement to Knobloch's base offense level 
increased his sentencing range from 130-147 months to 
147-168 months.6 Under these circumstances, we hold that 
the court committed plain error when it enhanced 
Knobloch's sentence in contravention of Application Note 2 
to U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
enhancement related to two separate guns. Finally, in United States v. 
Kimmons, 965 F.2d 1001 (11th Cir. 1992), the court devoted one 
paragraph to the sole issue of double counting, and it did not refer to 
Application Note 2. Kimmons also received a 924(c) sentence and a 
2K2.4 enhancement because he had armed both himself and his 
accomplice in a robbery. Thus, none of the cases cited by the 
government interprets Application Note 2. Nor does any of them present 
a situation, like the one here, where Application Note 2 was specifically 
called to the attention of the court as a bar to the enhancement at issue. 
 
6. This calculation includes the consecutive mandatory 60-month 
sentence under 18 U.S.C. S 924(c) added to base levels 27 and 29. 
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IV. Conclusion 
 
We will reverse the judgment of the district court and 
remand solely for resentencing in accordance with the 
Guidelines. 
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ROSENN, Circuit Judge, concurring: 
 
I concur with the majority with respect to its disposition 
that there was no plain error in the district court's 
description of the essential elements of an offense under 18 
U.S.C. S 924(c)(1). I also agree with the majority that there 
was no plain error in the district court's reliance on 
testimony from another trial in concluding that Knobloch 
was a leader, organizer, or supervisor. I, therefore, join with 
it as to these aspects of its opinion. I write separately 
primarily because, although I agree with the result the 
majority reaches as to all three issues in this appeal, I 
cannot agree that plain error is the proper standard of 
review of the defendant's claim that the district court 
improperly enhanced his base offense level based on his 
possession of two firearms in connection with his storing a 
cache of steroids in his apartment. 
 
As to the weapons possession issue, Knobloch contends 
that the enhancement violated U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4, 
Application Note 2. See Maj. op. at 10 (quoting Application 
Note 2). According to Knobloch, the application note 
prohibits a district court from enhancing, pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. S 2D1.1(b)(1), a defendant's base offense level for 
possessing a firearm when the defendant also is to be 
sentenced for a violation of 18 U.S.C. S 924(c)(1) even if the 
S 924(c)(1) sentence is for a different weapon than the 
weapon upon which the enhancement is predicated. 
 
The majority and I agree that Knobloch is correct on this 
point. The majority, however, concludes that plain error is 
the standard of review of this claim. See Maj. op. at 2, 7. 
The plain error standard of review applies on appeal when 
a defendant fails to object to an error in the court below. 
See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). The record and the briefs do not 
support the majority's conclusion that Knobloch failed to 
object to the enhancement. The Government explicitly and 
unequivocally conceded in its brief that Knobloch properly 
preserved this issue for appeal. Indeed, it stated that 
Knobloch's challenge "presents a legal issue subject to 
plenary review," see Gov't's br. at 2, and the Government 
never even mentioned "plain error" in connection with its 
argument on this issue. Id. at 23-25. That concession was 
appropriate in light of Knobloch's timely objection to the 
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imposition of the enhancement, albeit on a slightly different 
ground, (see App. at 80-81), and the probation officer's 
refusal to recommend the enhancement citing Application 
Note 2. See Addendum to Presentence Investigation Report 
at 1. I do not think that this court should second guess the 
Government's concession in its brief that Knobloch properly 
preserved this issue for appeal especially when there is no 
reason to do so. 
 
Although this may appear to be a small point, it is critical 
to this case. If plain error is the appropriate standard of 
review of Knobloch's claim, this court could not correct the 
error. A court of appeals may correct an unobjected-to error 
only if the error was "plain" and if it affected the 
defendant's "substantial rights." Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b); 
United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732 (1993). An error 
is plain only if it is "clear" or "obvious." 507 U.S. at 734 
(citing United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 17 n.14 (1985) 
and United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)). The 
rules permit a court of appeals to correct such an error 
because it is so clear or obvious that the district court 
should have avoided it even if it was not pointed out by the 
parties. The error committed by the district court in this 
case certainly was not clear or obvious. Indeed, the district 
court's construction of Application Note 2 may have been 
flawed but it was reasonable, was supported by case law 
from three other courts of appeal, and there are no cases to 
the contrary. The Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuit courts 
of appeal have all addressed this issue and determined that 
enhancement of a defendant's base offense level based on 
the possession of a firearm is permitted even when a 
defendant will receive a S 924(c)(1) sentence as long as the 
enhancement and sentence are based on different weapons, 
as is the case here. See United States v. Willett, 90 F.3d 
404, 408 (9th Cir. 1996) ("We find that the district court did 
not err in imposing the two-level enhancement on top of the 
S 924(c) conviction because the commission of a drug 
trafficking crime with a gun, silencer and knife poses a 
greater risk than does the commission of the same crime 
with only a gun"); United States v. Washington, 44 F.3d 
1271, 1280-81 (5th Cir. 1995) (permitting two-level 
enhancement based on co-conspirator's handgun 
possession when defendant is also to receive S 924(c) 
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sentence for a different weapon); United States v. Kimmons, 
965 F.2d 1001, 1011 (11th Cir. 1992) (same). Even if those 
cases are distinguishable on the grounds offered by the 
majority, they are not so plainly or obviously so as to make 
reliance upon them unreasonable. I, therefore, believe that 
under these circumstances, plain error should not be 
ascribed to the district court and the defendant may 
unequivocally raise the issue on appeal. 
 
I also note my disagreement with the majority's 
statement that the sentencing guidelines "authorize[ ] a 
specific offense characteristic enhancement only for a 
dangerous weapon possessed in connection with the offense 
of conviction ...." Maj. op. at 11. Although philosophically I 
may agree that this should be the rule, the language of the 
guidelines and the case law are to the contrary. It is well 
settled that when sentencing a defendant, a district court 
must consider all conduct relevant to the offense of 
conviction. U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3 provides that specific offense 
characteristics applied in controlled substance possession 
and distribution cases are to be determined based on"all 
acts and omissions ... that were part of the same course of 
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 
conviction." See also United States v. Frierson, 945 F.2d 
650, 652-53 (3d Cir. 1991) ("relevant conduct also includes 
all acts and omissions that were `part of the same course of 
conduct or common scheme or plan as the offense of 
conviction' ") (quoting U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3).1 According to the 
guideline commentary, offenses are part of the same course 
of conduct if they are similar to each other or are 
committed close in time. See U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application 
Note 9(B). 
 
In this case, there is no serious dispute that Knobloch's 
August 28, 1995, possession of the steroids in his 
apartment is part of the same course of conduct as the 
offense of conviction, the August 28, 1995, distribution of 
steroids to Davis. Both offenses were committed on the 
same day and involve the same drug. If that is the case, 
then the possession of the two firearms in connection with 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Accord United States v. Ortega, 94 F.3d 764, 767-68 (2d Cir. 1996); 
United States v. Ignacio Munio, 909 F.2d 436, 439 (11th Cir. 1990). 
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the steroids stored in Knobloch's apartment must be part of 
the same course of conduct as the distribution of steroids 
to Davis. Thus, application of the specific offense 
characteristic of firearms possession is appropriate. 
U.S.S.G. S 1B1.3, Application Note 3 does not support the 
majority's conclusion that specific offense characteristics 
only apply to the offense of conviction. Indeed, that 
application note states that conduct for which the 
defendant was not convicted must be considered in 
calculating an offense level as long as it comes within the 
definition of S 1B1.3. 
 
Nonetheless, I would still reverse the district court on 
this issue because U.S.S.G. S 2K2.4, Application Note 2 
prohibits a district court from enhancing a defendants' 
offense level no matter how many weapons a defendant 
possesses if he is to receive a sentence for a S 924(c)(1) 
violation as long as all of the weapons are possessed or 
used as part of the same course of conduct or common 
plan or scheme. This conclusion is mandated by the broad 
language used by the guideline drafters. Application Note 2 
prohibits application of "any specific offense characteristic" 
for weapons possession when the defendant is to receive a 
sentence under S 924(c) (emphasis added). 
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